Incident Management Advisors

It’s frustrating to see poor incident management practices. For years I’ve reviewed plans that have wild org charts supposedly based on the Incident Command System (ICS); have conducted advanced-level training with seasoned professionals that still don’t grasp the basic concepts; have conducted and evaluated exercises and participated in incident responses in which people clearly don’t understand how to implement the most foundational aspects of ICS. On a regular basis, especially since people know my focus on the subject, I’m told of incident management practices that range from sad to ridiculous.

Certainly not everyone gets it wrong. I’ve seen plans, met people, and witnessed exercises and incidents in which people clearly understand the concepts of ICS and know how to put it into action. ICS is a machine, but it takes deliberate and constant action to make it work. It has no cruise control or auto pilot, either. Sometimes just getting the incident management organization to stay the course is a job unto itself.

If you are new here, I’ve written plenty on the topic. Here’s a few things to get you pointed in the right direction if you want to read more.

ICS Training Sucks. There are a series of related posts that serve as a key stone to so much that I write about.

The Human Factor of Incident Management. This bunch of related articles is about how ICS isn’t the problem, it’s how people try to implement it.  

As I’ve mentioned in other posts, it’s unrealistic for us to expect most local jurisdictions to assemble and maintain anything close to a formal incident management team. We need, instead, to focus on improving implementation of foundational ICS concepts at the local level, which means we need to have better training and related preparedness activities to promote this. Further, we also know that from good management practices as well as long-standing practices of incident management teams, that mentoring is a highly effective means of guiding people down the right path. In many ways, I see that as an underlying responsibility of mine as a consultant. Sometimes clients don’t have the time to get a job done, but often they don’t have the in-house talent. While some consultants may baulk at the mere thought of building capability for a client (they are near sighted enough to think it will put them out of work), the better ones truly have the interests of their clients and the practice of emergency management as a whole in mind.

So what and how do we mentor in this capacity? First of all, relative to incident management, I’d encourage FEMA to develop a position in the National Qualification System for Incident Management Advisors. Not only should these people be knowledgeable in implementations of ICS and EOC management, but also practiced in broader incident management issues. Perhaps an incident doesn’t need a full incident management team, but instead just one or two people to help the local team get a system and battle rhythm established and maintained. One responsibility I had when recently supporting a jurisdiction for the pandemic was mentoring staff in their roles and advising the organization on incident management in a broader sense. They had some people who handled things quite well, but there was a lot of agreement in having someone focus on implementation. I also did this remotely, demonstrating that it doesn’t have to be in person.

In preparedness, I think there is similar room for an incident management advisor. Aside from training issues, which I’ve written at length about over the years (of course there will be more!), I think a lot of support is needed in the realm of planning. Perhaps a consultant isn’t needed to write an entire plan, but rather an advisor to ensure that the incident management practices identified in planning documents are sound and consistent with best practices, meet expectations, and can be actually implemented. So much of what I see in planning in regard to incident management has one or more of these errors:

  1. Little mention of incident management beyond the obligatory statement of using NIMS/ICS.
  2. No identification of how the system is activated and/or maintained.
  3. As an extension of #2, no inclusion of guidance or job aids on establishing a battle rhythm, incident management priorities, etc.
  4. An obvious mis-understanding or mis-application of incident management concepts/ICS, such as creating unnecessary or redundant organizational elements or titles, or trying to force concepts that simply don’t apply or make sense.
  5. No thought toward implementation and how the plan will actually be operationalized, not only in practice, but also the training and guidance needed to support it.

In addition to planning, we need to do better at identifying incident management issues during exercises, formulating remedies to address areas for improvement, and actually implementing and following up on those actions. I see far too many After Action Reports (AARs) that softball incident management shortfalls or don’t go into enough detail to actually identify the problem and root cause. The same can be said for many incident AARs.

When it comes to emergency management, and specifically incident management, we can’t expect to improve without being more direct about what needs to be addressed and committing to corrective actions. We can do better. We MUST do better.

New polling function in WordPress… Let’s give it a try.

©2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

A NEW NYS Public Employer Emergency Planning Requirement

On Labor Day, NYS Governor Cuomo signed a bill requiring public employers to develop a very specific emergency plan for future public health emergencies. This may include a continuation of the Coronavirus pandemic, or another emergency. Some details and guidance below…

WHO

The requirement applies to public employers, including:

  • State, county, and local governments
  • Public authorities (bridge, water, airport, etc.)
  • Commissions
  • Public corporations
  • Agencies
  • School districts
    • It’s important to note that the requirement for school districts has also been codified into state education law through this bill, to be included in school safety plans.

WHAT

The new law requires these plans to include the following:

  • A list and description of positions and titles considered essential
    • Note that the definition of ‘essential’ in the bill means employees who must work on site.
  • Protocols which will enable non-essential employees to work remotely
  • A description of how work shifts can be staggered to reduce overcrowding on public transportation and in the workplace
  • Protocols for procuring, storing, and distributing PPE
  • Protocols to prevent the spread of disease if an employee is exposed, symptomatic, or tests positive for the disease in question
  • Protocols for documenting hours and work locations of all employees for contract tracing
  • Protocols for coordinating with applicable government entities for emergency housing for employees, if needed

WHEN

Though there were no timeframes included in the bill itself, the Governor’s website provided two benchmarks of time. It states that plans are to be submitted to unions and labor management committees within 150 days, and all plans must be finalized by April 1, 2021.

The 150-day timeframe is obviously a bit confusing, as it doesn’t give a start date (i.e. 150 days from when?). I’ve sent inquiries to the Governor’s office, as well as my State Assemblyman and State Senator for clarification. Once I have an answer, I’ll provide it as a comment to this post. I will note that if the 150 day clock started on Labor Day, that alarm will go off on Friday February 4, 2021.

Once finalized, the plan must be included in any existing employee handbook and made otherwise available to employees. In terms of any kind of oversight or audit, there is no provision for such identified in the legislation. Aside from the requirement for school districts to meet this requirement being appended to state education law, this bill appends state labor law. As such, the NYS Department of Labor would have enforcement oversight, if they chose to or are directed to do so. That said, the bill does direct the NYS Department of Labor to establish procedures to allow for public employees to contact and inform the Department of any alleged or believed violations of the provisions of the law. Further, they are directed to establish a webpage and hotline to facilitate such.

HOW

Unfortunately, no existing planning requirement or standard will meet this requirement. While there are elements of continuity of operations planning in this, the focus is shifted and hits some very specific elements which are likely not included in many continuity of operations plans. That said, a new plan needs to be developed to meet this requirement. These elements certainly can be appended into a continuity of operations plan, but it’s important to note that these provisions are intended for future public health emergencies (not that some couldn’t be used for other hazards), and that, should any kind of audit occur, for those purposes it’s usually better to meet requirements through stand-alone documents.

As most public employees are members of labor organizations (unions), and the bill itself was endorsed by the AFL-CIO, there is a requirement for employers to submit the plans to unions and labor management committees for review. These entities have an option to provide comment, to which the employer is required to provide written responses prior to finalizing the plan.

There is some thought and coordination required to make this an effective and meaningful plan which also meets the legal requirements. Detail will need to be developed, specific to each public employer and their circumstances, for the protocols required in the plan. When developing procedure and protocol, be sure to:

  1. identify specifically what needs to be done,
  2. who the action agents are,
  3. what the ideal end state is,
  4. the timeframe in which it should be accomplished, and
  5. who has decision-making authority over those actions

Of course, in developing the plan, the best guidance I can give is to follow the planning process identified in FEMA’s CPG 101. Lastly, be sure to consider that the specific actions we have taken in response to the Coronavirus pandemic may not be the actions we take for another disease. Plans must maintain this flexibility.

NEED HELP?

Recognizing the challenges associated with developing this plan for small and large entities alike, my company – Emergency Preparedness Solutions (EPS) – has developed a template to support these planning requirements. We are making this template free for use by NYS public employers. I continue to have concerns with templates, cautioning against people simply ‘pencil whipping’ the document, but the developed template includes a lot of guidance and identifies content areas which need to be specifically developed by the public employer, so if the planning process is properly followed, I don’t expect that will be a problem with this template.

A BIT OF AN AD

Further, if jurisdictions want assistance in developing these plans, EPS is available to assist (contractually, of course). We’ve spent a lot of time reviewing these new requirements since they were signed and we’re already slated to discuss these in some webinars for specific public employer groups in New York State. Knowing that some small jurisdictions may be in a bit of a bind to meet this requirement, we are offering our services relative to this plan at not cost for the first 10 NYS public employers which employ between 1 and 10 full time employees if we have an executed contract by November 30th of this year – so be sure to contact us soon!

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

Learning from the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Response (Guest Post)

Another great article from Alison Poste. Please be sure to check out her blog – The Afterburn – at www.afterburnblog.com.

I’m looking forward to reading about the adaptations to ICS she references in this article.

-TR

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Learning from the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Response

The ICS model remains a universal command and control standard for crisis response. In contrast to traditional operations-based responses, the COVID-19 pandemic has required a ‘knowledge-based’ framework. 

A fundamental element of ICS is the rapid establishment of a single chain of command. Once established, a basic organization is put in place including the core functions of operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration. In the face of a major incident, there is potential for people and institutions to work at cross purposes. The ICS model avoids this by rapidly integrating people and institutions into a single, integrated response organization preserving the unity of command and span of control. Support to the Incident Commander (the Command Staff) includes a Public Information Officer (PIO), a Liaison Officer and a Safety Officer.

In a study done by Chris Ansell and Ann Keller for the IBM Center for the Business of Government in 2014, the response of the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP) to the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic was examined in depth. In examining the response, a number of prior outbreak responses were reviewed. Prior to the widespread adoption of ICS, “the CDCP viewed its emergency operations staff as filling an advisory role rather than a leadership role during the crisis” (Ansell and Keller, 2014). This advisory function was the operating principle of the 2003 SARS outbreak response.

ICS was created to coordinate responses that often extend beyond the boundaries of any individual organizations’ capacity to respond. Considering the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response, the authors outline three features complicated the use of the traditional ICS paradigm:

  • The overall mission in a pandemic response is to create authoritative knowledge rather than the delivery of an operational response;
  • The use of specialized knowledge from a wide and dispersed range of sources; and 
  • The use of resources to manage external perceptions of the CDCP’s response.

In response to these unique features, the authors of the study have advocated seven adaptations to the ‘traditional’ ICS structure. These adaptations will be examined in depth in a future post.

Notwithstanding the unique challenges of a ‘knowledge-based’ response, the ‘traditional’ ICS structure is well-equipped to adapt and scale to the needs of any incident. While it is true that a ‘knowledge-based’ response differs from an operational one, this is not inconsistent with the two top priorities of the ICS model: #1: Life Safety and #2: Incident (Pandemic) Stabilization. The objectives of the incident will determine the size of the organization. Secondly, the modular ICS organization is able to rapidly incorporate specialized knowledge and expand/contract as the demands of the incident evolve. Finally, assigning resources to monitor external communications will remain the purview of the PIO as a member of Command Staff.

When the studies are written on the use of ICS in the COVID-19 pandemic, what do you think will be the key take-aways? As always, I’m interested to hear your thoughts and ideas for future topics.

Reference

Ansell, Chris and Ann Keller. 2014. Adapting the Incident Command Model for Knowledge-Based Crises: The Case of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. IBM Center for the Business of Government. Retrieved August 16, 2020 from http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Adapting%20the%20Incident%20Command%20Model%20for%20Knowledge-Based%20Crises.pdf 

How BC is Acing the Pandemic Test (Guest Post)

I’m excited and honored to promote a new blog being written by Alison Poste. Alison has led major disaster response and recovery efforts in Alberta, Canada, including the 2013 floods and the Fort McMurray wildfires, and currently works as a consultant specializing in business continuity, emergency management, and crisis communications. Her new blog, The Afterburn – Emergency Management Lessons from Off the Shelf, takes a critical look at lessons learned and how they are applied.

I’ve pasted her first post below, but also be sure to click the link above to follow her blog. I’m really excited about the insight Alison will be providing!

– TR

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The pandemic has upended how those in the emergency management field have seen traditional response frameworks. Lessons learned from the pandemic response will be useful to governments and the private sector alike in the coming years.

The ICS framework for emergency response is well equipped to address the unique needs of any disaster, including a global pandemic. The rapid scalability of the structure allows the response to move faster than the speed of government. It provides the framework for standardized emergency response in British Columbia (B.C.).

The B.C. provincial government response to the coronavirus pandemic, led by Dr. Bonnie Henry, the Provincial Health Officer (PHO) has received international acclaim. It is useful therefore to learn from the best practises instituted early on in the pandemic to inform future events. 

In February 2020, the Province of B.C. published a comprehensive update to the British Columbia Pandemic Provincial Coordination Plan outlining the provincial strategy for cross-ministry coordination, communications and business continuity measures in place to address the pandemic. Based on ICS, the B.C. emergency response framework facilitates effective coordination by ensuring the information shared is consistent and effective. The Province of B.C. has provided a daily briefing by Dr. Henry and Adrian Dix, the B.C. Minister of Health as a way to ensure B.C. residents receive up to date information from an authoritative source.

While we may consider the COVID-19 pandemic to be a unique event, a number of studies have provided guidance to emergency response practitioners of today. The decisive action taken by the B.C. PHO on COVID-19, has focused on the twin pillars of containment and contact tracing. Early studies regarding the effect of contract tracing on transmission rates have seen promising results, however the tracing remains a logistical burden. As studies indicate, these logistical challenges have the potential to overwhelm the healthcare system should travel restrictions be relaxed, leading to the possible ‘importation’ of new infections. 

B.C. has instituted robust contract tracing mechanisms to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in alignment with best practises in other jurisdictions. When instituted methodically, contact tracing, consistent communication, and Dr. Henry’s mantra to “Be calm. Be kind. Be safe.” remain critical tools to ensure limited spread, a well-informed and socially cohesive population.

How has your organization helped to slow the spread of COVID-19?  As always, I welcome your feedback and suggestions for how to improve the blog.