You’ve Been Trained, Now What?

I just sat through a good webinar on incident response and management. The panel consisted of fire and law enforcement personnel. A law enforcement official was rather honest in saying that one of their identified deficiencies from an AAR was poor implementation of ICS. He said that while all police personnel had received ICS training back during the NIMS push of the mid-2000s, most officers had done little with it since. We see so many endless lists of training that people have taken on their CVs, resumes, LinkedIn, etc., but how much of that do they still know? Take an honest look at your own resume of training and I bet you will see some of the same.

In public safety we love to get training. A lot of the training is good. Some less so. Much of the training we take is awareness-level training, providing us with knowledge. It’s fairly easy to flex those muscles after the training by reading about, writing about, teaching, or doing other things with that information. Still, some of that acquired knowledge stagnates. Some of the training we take is more operations-based – it’s hands on or procedural. Most certainly, without using the knowledge and skills acquired in operations-based training, those skills atropy.

So what should we do to protect our loss of these valuable knowledge and skills acquired? Obviously application is the best means of preserving what we have learned. Even if you are using it, though, it’s good to stay on top of best practices, new practices, and updated training; not only as a means of staying current on the latest and greatest, but also to hedge against bad habits as well as certain nuggets of that original training we might not regularly perform. Apply and practice skills, either on the job or in exercises. For things that are more knowledge-based, talk about it, read about it, write about, or present on it. This repetition will keep the subject matter familiar and quicken your recall of facts and increase your ability to analyze it. Writing can be in any form, up to and including developing or updating plans and procedures. A special shout out goes to presentations and training (if you are qualified), though. Training and presentations often require the instructor/presenter to have a depth of knowledge beyond the learning domain of what they are teaching or presenting on. This is often required to answer questions, support implementation, and address the many what-ifs related to the subject matter.

I’d argue that your organization also has a role (and responsibility) in preserving these gained knowledge and skills as well. First, sharing of the experience is important. Since not everyone in your organization can attend every training opportunity, it’s a best practice for those who receive training to tell others about their experience, what they learned, and the relevance they see to their work. Simpler subject matter can be provided in an email or printed handout, while more complex subject matter might be better conveyed through a presentation. Unless your training was received to help you support an existing plan or procedure, your organization should also support implementation of what you have learned, if appropriate. Keeping knowledge and skills fresh should also be endorsed through opportunities for refresher training and other related training which may expand the knowledge and skills or hone specific application. Organizations should also identify what knowledge and skills they need and must maintain, and ensure that they identify staff that need the opportunities for training and development, as well as how to maintain what is learned.

With the personal and organizational costs of training, we reap the greatest benefit by maintaining or advancing the knowledge and proficiency gained. While the quest for knowledge is endless and admirable, and I’d generally never block an opportunity for someone to gain more, we should be assessing what the benefit is to learner and to the organization. Part of that is determining what commitments the organization and the learner must make to preserve what is gained. I believe that employee development plans can be a big part of this, as they should be informed by what the employee needs to improve upon, what we want them to excel at, and what future roles we may have planned for them. These factors drive the goals and objectives of the employee development plan which should also lead to what training opportunities are ideal to support these goals and objectives. Even if your organization doesn’t do any formal employee development plans, you can develop one for yourself.

What’s your take on keeping current with what you’ve learned?

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

Experience Bias

I recently read an interesting piece in Psychology Today by Dr. Christopher Dwyer titled ‘How Experience Can Hinder Critical Thinking’. Do check it out. There is application to pretty much everything, but of course I tend to think of things in the context of emergency management.

The article starts with the age long argument of education vs experience, but with a particular slant toward critical thinking. My personal take is that the education vs experience argument, in its totality, can’t have a blanket resolution. I think a lot of it is dependent on the topic at hand, and obviously it’s rarely a dichotomy, rather a blending of education and experience is often best. In regard to education, certainly the actual education received holds value, but there are tasks intrinsic to academia which also hold value, perhaps even more than what was learned in the classroom; the rigors of research in an academic environment often being most valuable among them. With that, in many regards, we often see employment announcements with a range of degree majors, or just simply a stated minimum of education, regardless of major. This is in recognition of the intrinsic value of education. And while some professions absolutely require a specific degree, those which don’t, can and should hold less rigidly to those requirements.

While I certainly advocate a minimum extent of education for most positions, I’ve also worked with a considerable number of people with a high school diploma or associate’s degree that can intellectually run circles around those with advanced degrees, at least in certain applications of work and life. Experience is often indicative of exposure to certain situations, often with repetition. The comparing and contrasting of those experiences with what is being experienced in the moment is what supports the argument for the value of experience. It’s also why many advanced degree programs actually require some term of actual work experience before they will accept applicants into their programs. Consider academic programs such as criminal justice. Sure, there are a lot of philosophical topics that are taught, but any courses that speak to practical application should probably be taught by those with actual experience doing those things. Though Dr. Dwyer gives wise advice, stating that we shouldn’t confuse experience with expertise.

All that said, Dr. Dwyer’s article focuses on the application of critical thinking in this argument. He cites some insightful data and studies, but most interesting to me is his mention of experience being personalized. While several people may have ‘been there, done that, got the t-shirt’, they each may have experienced the event differently or left with different impressions, even if exposed to some of the same situations. We all bring a bias with us, and this bias in the lens through which we view the events of our lives. That bias is then influenced by our perception of each event, fundamentally snowballing and compounding with the more experiences we have. This shows how our experiences can bias our own critical thinking skills. Dr. Dwyer states that critical thinking stemming from someone with more education than experience is likely to be more objective and based on knowledge, which certainly makes sense. That said, individuals basing their critical thinking solely on education may miss insight provided experiences, which can provide considerable context to the thought exercise.

I think the conclusion to be drawn in all this is that critical thinking, in most regards, is optimized by those with a blend of education and experience. It’s also extremely important for us to recognize our own limitations and biases when we approach a decision or other relevant situation. Specific to emergency management, we can leverage a lot from our experiences, but we also know that no two incidents are the same. Therefore, while our experiences can support us in a new event, they can also derail us if not applied thoughtfully and in recognition of our own biases.

This all comes around to my advocacy for emergency management broadly, and incident management in particular, being team sports. Even the first step of the CPG 101 planning process is to form a planning team. We each bring different approaches and perspectives. We also need to advocate for diversity in our teams, regardless of what tasks those teams are charged with. This should be diversity in the broadest sense – diversity of experience, diversity of discipline, diversity in education, diversity in gender, diversity in race, creed, culture, etc. The broader the better. We must do better opening ourselves to the perspectives of others. We all have bias – every one of us. Some bias, obviously depending on the focus, is OK, but it is best for us to balance our individual bias with those of a diverse group. A diverse team approach will bring us better results time and again.

How does experience bias impact you?

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

FEMA’s First Lessons Learned From COVID-19

FEMA recently released the Pandemic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Initial Assessment Report (January – September 2020). The report has many elements of a traditional after-action report. The authors reinforce that the report only evaluates FEMA’s response, not those of other agencies or entities. That said, emergency management, by nature is collaborative and FEMA’s interactions with other agencies and entities are cited as necessary. The report covers five primary areas of evaluation:

  1. Coordinating Structures and Policy
  2. Resources
  3. Supporting State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Partners
  4. Preparedness and Information Analysis
  5. Organizational Resilience

Also, with similarity to a traditional after-action report, this report provides a table of key findings and recommendations as Appendix A.

Here are some of my primary observations:

Following the executive summary is a the COVID-19 Pandemic Overview, which is a well-constructed piece providing a combined narrative timeline and topical highlights, providing information and context to the pandemic and the response, as well as some of the complexities encountered. While the report does well to acknowledge the myriad disasters that SLTT partners and federal agencies responded to over 2020, I find it shameful that they very obviously ignore the societal impacts of the US political climate (related to the pandemic and otherwise) as well as events surrounding the BLM movement. I firmly believe this report should fully acknowledge these factors and could have done so without itself making a political statement. These were important, impactful, and far-reaching, certainly influencing the operating environment, public information, and other very real facets of the response. I feel that the exclusion of these factors leaves this report incomplete.

Relative to the Coordinating Structures and Policy section, FEMA reinforces many, many times that they were put into a leadership position for this disaster that was unexpected and perhaps led to some coordination problems. I feel FEMA should always be a lead or co-lead agency for the federal response for large disasters regardless of the hazard. While a pandemic is certainly a public health hazard, FEMA has practiced experience in federal coordination to major disasters, mobilization of resources and logistical support, SLTT coordination, and overall incident management. The Unified Coordination Group is a sound application in situations where other federal agencies share significant authority. The kinks should be worked out of this, with the National Response Framework updated to reflect such.

Also mentioned within this section is the creation of a White House Task Force which was intended to make executive decisions of the highest level. This is not unprecedented and should certainly be expected for other large-scale disasters in the future. I feel, however, that removing the FEMA Administrator from having a direct line of communication with the White House during ‘peace time’ has significant impact on FEMA leadership’s ability to integrate. Positioning FEMA subordinate to the Secretary of Homeland Security is akin to putting a police officer in charge of a pool and keeping the lifeguard in the breakroom. Sure, the police officer can do a lot, but there are specific skills needed which necessitate that the lifeguard has a constant presence at the pool rather than only being called in when something gets bad enough. 

FEMA makes a point about inheriting eight task forces created by HHS which then needed to be integrated into the NRCC organization. These task forces had some overlap with the existing NRCC and ESF structure, resulting in duplications of effort and coordination problems. While FEMA says they were able to overcome this over time, it is obviously something that, given the National Response Framework, should have not happened in the first place. FEMA’s recommendations associated with this matter do not once cite the National Response Framework and instead point the finger at NIMS/ICS use, fully ignoring that the foundation of preparedness is planning. Either HHS made these task forces up on the fly or had a plan in place that accounted for their creation. Either way, it’s the National Response Framework that was ignored. NIMS/ICS helps support plan implementation.

The next section on resource management demonstrates that FEMA learned a lot about some intricacies of resource management they may have not previously encountered. With the full mobilization of resources across the nation for the pandemic, along with targeted mobilizations for other disasters, the system was considerably stressed. FEMA adapted their systems and processes, and in some cases developed new methodologies to address resource management needs. One key finding identified was a need to better integrate private sector partners, which isn’t surprising. I think we often take for granted the resources and systems needed to properly coordinate with the private sector on a large scale during a disaster. One of the largest disasters within this disaster was that of failed supply chains. Granted, the need was unprecedented, but we certainly need to bolster our preparedness in this area.

To help address supply chain issues, novel solutions such as Project Airbridge and specific applications of the Defense Production Act were used. The best practices from these strategies must be memorialized in the form of a national plan for massive resource mobilizations.

SLTT support for the time period of the report was largely successful, which isn’t a surprise since it’s fundamentally what FEMA does as the main coordination point between SLTT partners and federal agencies. Significant mobilizations of direct federal support to SLTT partners took place. The pandemic has provided the best proof of concept of the FEMA Integration Teams (FIT) since their development in 2017. With established relationships with SLTT partners and knowledge of needs of the federal system, they provided support, liaised, and were key to shared situational awareness. I appreciate that one of the recommendations in this section was development of a better concept of operations to address the roles and responsibilities of FIT and IMATs.

One item not directly addressed in this section was that in emergency management we have a great culture of sharing resources and people. Sharing was pretty limited in the pandemic since everyone was impacted and everyone needed resources. This caused an even greater demand on FEMA’s resources since SLTT partners largely weren’t able to support each other as they often do during disasters.

The section on preparedness and information analysis was interesting, especially on the information analysis side. The preparedness findings weren’t really much of a surprise, including not anticipating supply chain issues or SLTT needs. What this boils down to is a lack of effective plans for nation-wide disasters. On the information side, the key findings really boil down to not only improved defining of data sets and essential elements of information relative to specific needs, audiences, functions, capabilities, and lines of effort. It appears a lot was learned about not only the information needed, but also how to best utilize that information. Analytics makes data meaningful and supports better situational awareness and common operating picture.

The last section on FEMA’s organizational resilience is a good look at some of the inner workings and needs of FEMA as an agency and how they endured the pandemic and the varied demands on the agency. FEMA has always had a great culture of most employees having a disaster job which they are prepared to move into upon notice. They learned about some of the implications associated with this disaster, such as issues with engaging such a large portion of their employees in long-term deployments, public health protection, and mental health matters.

Ultimately, despite my disagreement with a couple of recommendations and leaving out some very important factors, the report is honest and, if the corrective actions are implemented, will support a stronger FEMA in the future. I’m hopeful we see a lot of these AAR types of documents across federal agencies, state agencies, local governments, the private sector, etc. EVERYONE learned from this pandemic, and continues to learn. That said, while the efforts of individual entities hold a lot of value, there also needs to be a broader, more collective examination of ‘our’ response to this disaster. This would be a monumental first task for a National Disaster Safety Board, would it not? 

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

The Contrarian Emergency Manager™

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

New EOC Toolkit Documents

FEMA announced the release of five EOC Toolkit documents on their website. In downloading these documents, I’m actually finding six documents, all with file dates of January 8, 2021. What’s there:

  • Tips for Healthcare Professionals: Coping with Stress and Compassion Fatigue
  • Tips for Disaster Responders: Preventing and Managing Stress
  • An Exercise for Creating Position Task Books from EOC Skillsets
    • Exercise Cards for the above referenced exercise (probably why they indicate only five documents, though this is a separate download)
  • EOC Financial Tools Reference Fact Sheet
  • EOC Operations Period Briefing Template

A quick review:

Coupling together the Tips for Healthcare Professionals and Tips for Disaster Responders as they both deal with workplace stress; these are really good documents that provide information, tools, and resources for recognizing and managing stress. Both are developed by the HHS Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. What I’d like to see, though, are documents actually developed for EOCs. It might seem a bit petty, while nearly 100% of the information in these documents is applicable to an EOC environment, this is yet another example of emergency management needing to borrow best practices from others and not getting something of our own. A simple change in the title and focusing the scope of the documents can go a long way. I would hope that FEMA and the National Integration Center would be supporting emergency management a bit more by at least giving us things that are intentionally developed for us.

I’m also coupling together the two documents of the EOC Skillsets Exercise instructions and cards; the purpose of the exercise is to create position task books (PTBs) from the list of EOC Skillsets. The exercise is used to help familiarize participants with the EOC Skillsets and to give leaders a practical, scenario-based experience in building position qualifications based on an organization’s needs and resources. I’ll be honest that I have some mixed feelings about this. I’m not sure of the real value of this exercise. Sure it’s nice to teach people new things and an exercise like this can be useful for getting buy-in on the qualifications certain positions should have, but the EOC Skillset Guide already gives us alignment of the EOC Skillsets for each of the primary EOC positions for the common, NIMS-identified EOC model organizations. That said, if your EOC has an organizational deviation from these models, the exercise could be helpful.

The EOC Financial Tools Reference Fact Sheet is a pretty good overview and list of resources for incident financial management, including guidelines and practices for reimbursement. A solid document. I think the document could be expanded upon by some experienced Finance/Admin Section Chiefs, Public Assistance SMEs, and Individual Assistance SMEs – to not only provide additional information, guidance, and tools, but also to address the continuum of financial management and reimbursement that starts with preparedness and goes through response then into disaster recovery, with the ultimate goal of maximizing reimbursement for eligible expenses.

Lastly, the EOC Operations Period Briefing Template. The document provides the pretty standard guidance for an Ops Period Briefing seen in ICS-related publications and introduces a couple of topics that are important to EOCs which are typically not found in field-level applications. That said, this is called a template. It’s laid out as a template. The instructions even say that the template is customizable. They give you the document as a PDF. <shrug>

Wrapping this up, these are documents that really can help EOCs and EOC personnel, but we see some shortfalls because of simple lack of thought, perspective, and utility. Continuous improvement, however, should always be a goal, and we need to start somewhere. I’m hoping these, and other documents will evolve as needs and opportunities are identified.

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

The Contrarian Emergency Manager™

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

The Contrarian Emergency Manager

Going into the new year, I’ve changed the title of my blog to The Contrarian Emergency Manager. It’s a moniker I don’t take lightly, and I feel it reflects many of my positions and attitudes on our field of practice. Emergency management struggles with a number of issues, including a bit of an identity crisis, accountability (mostly to ourselves), and complacency. Yes, we have an incredibly hard working, dedicated slate of professionals and those who have been reading my blog know that it’s a rare exception for me to sling mud at any persons specifically. Our culture, systems, perceptions, and attitudes are what I endeavor to shed light on. Some positive, some negative, some simply are what they are.

Perhaps one of my most consistent pursuits has been to crack open some of the things which emergency managers are too accepting of. Through the years I’ve ranted about things like ICS training and National Preparedness Reports. The state of those, and others, is simply not good, yet not holding accountability for those responsible for them coupled with a complacent attitude about the current state of them has us stuck in the mud. It is not a role of emergency managers to look at things differently than others and to solve problems?

Words have meaning and provide us with some interesting lexicons and perceptions. The word ‘contrarian’ seems to often have a negative connotation, one of someone who is constantly a nay-sayer. In reality, it’s defined as someone who challenges the norm, which I think is often a healthy reality check. Complacency is an enemy of which we must always be vigilant. Challenges, to serve proper purpose, should also be constructive. I’ve worked with and for obstructionists. People who aren’t challenging norms or providing constructive feedback; these are people who dig in on anything that opposes their opinions and perceptions. Obstructionists thrive in negativity. While I’ve pointed out many of the things in emergency management I feel need to be fixed, I’ve also celebrated accomplishments. In holding myself accountable, I endeavor to give thoughtful critiques to the subjects about which I write. Simply saying something is bad is superficial and not at all helpful. I like to dig deeper, give some thoughtful analysis, and explain why I have the opinions I do, and as often as possible, provide my thoughts on alternative approaches which could lend improvement.

Emergency management is a practice that often thrives on theory, despite some harsh realities of implementation and impacts. We do many things a certain way because that’s how they’ve been done for years. We do other things because there is no convenient alternative. There is much we accept simply because we don’t really take the time to peel back some layers. We like to think things are better than they are, even though we live in a world of ‘what-ifs’. Perhaps doing so is overwhelming to some, but we need to remember that our work impacts the lives of real, actual people. Our work is more than just words in a plan or a training certificate or a pat on the back after an exercise. We may not perceive that impact because we aren’t putting water on fires or stopping bleeding. That, unfortunately, is a reflection of attitudes that others have of us. Our work is just as important, if not more so, because we address the big picture of emergencies and disasters.

Emergency management is an amalgamation of a field, inheriting practices from partner public safety disciplines and other sources. Those practices may work well in those disciplines, but they may not for us. Change and evolution can be difficult pills to swallow. I feel that often as a culture we’re also afraid of being critical. I think this stems from the essence of emergency management – collaboration. By nature we must work well with other agencies and organizations because that’s how emergency management as a concept works. Our fear of offending holds us back. Let’s not equate critical thinking and analysis with making offense.

I’ve railed on FEMA pretty hard over the years on things like ICS training, doctrine, and other matters. They unfortunately become the target because they are the action agent at the center of so much in emergency management. They are, however, heavily influenced by politics, priorities from external entities, and (lack of) budget. I get quite a bit of feedback from folks at FEMA, which I greatly appreciate. It’s a rare occasion they can comment publicly or in writing, but the phone calls I receive from professionals in FEMA are encouraging. Believe it or not, I’ve been thanked, with sincerity, for many of the perspectives I’ve offered. I’m told that I’ve been able to unknowingly serve as their proxy for fights they aren’t allowed to take up. I know I’ve pissed some people off, too. That’s generally not my intent, though that’s a reality I accept. My goal is to satisfy most of the people most of the time with thoughtful diatribes.

The goal of what I write is to encourage the emergency management community to consider our attitudes, practices, perceptions, and ways of thinking. For some of our practices, the status quo may very well be fine; but we should pull back the curtain and shine a light on others. There are many areas in which I feel we can do better and be better.

As we start the new year, please remember that your thoughts and feedback are always appreciated. The absolute best way for us to learn is through dialogue (the topic of my wife’s doctoral dissertation).

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

The Contrarian Emergency Manager

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

A Re-Framing of Incident Management Structures

I recently finished reading Team of Teams by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The General tells of the new perspective and strategy he needed to employ to better manage the Joint Special Operations Task Force in the 2000s hunting down Al Qaeda insurgents. The Task Force was being out paced by a decentralized organization with all the home team advantages. McChrystal and his team assessed where the Task Force was failing and applied new principles which brought them increased success. The book not only provides examples from the Task Force, but also goes through history and various applications of business and industry to illustrate how different perspectives on organizational management can bring better results. It was fascinating to read this with the constant thought of incident management on my mind and seeing how the early state of the Joint Special Operations Task Force, as well as many of the business and industry examples, had many of the same challenges of incident management today. Highly recommended reading!

Those of you who have been with me for a while know that I’m a big fan of the Incident Command System (ICS), even though I have a lot of issues with how we have been trying to train people to use it (ICS Training Sucks). Similarly, I have a lot of passion for Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and the various organizational models which can be used in these facilities, including those which have a lot of similarity to ICS. I’ll collectively refer to these as incident management.

The root of Gen. McChrystal’s book emphasizes the benefits of organizations that are flexible and collaborative, vs the traditional hierarchal organizations. It’s interesting that much of what we espouse as successful implementations in incident management focuses on flexibility and working together, yet the organizational models we use, and sometimes even just the way we depict them, impedes this success. The traditional org charts that we obsessively plaster up on every wall of every command post and EOC emphasize a chain of command, which is so often confused with lines of communication and the continued and necessary close coordination we need to have in an incident management organization. While chain of command is still necessary to understand, that’s really the only value of the hierarchal organization chart.

From Team of Teams, I’d like you to look at two sets of graphics which are found on this site. (these are important to look at… so click the link!) The first identifies complicated vs complex systems (or environments). Complicated systems may be multi-faceted, but largely have a linear progression. Complex systems are unpredictable. I’d offer that incident management can include both, being a complex system until such a point that we can stabilize the incident, then morphing into a more predictable though still complicated system. The primary argument of Team of Teams is to match the organizational structure to the environment, meaning that while a more linear, hierarchal organizational structure is fine for a complicated system, a more dynamic structure is needed for dealing with complex systems.

The second set of graphics depicts three organizational models from Team of Teams. The first is the familiar Command model. This model, as I mentioned earlier, emphasizes chain of command, though clearly also emphasizes stove-piping, which isn’t a reflection of best practices for being dynamic or having coordination across organizational elements. As argued in the book, the separation of organizational elements only works if their functions are not related or connected. We know in ICS that each function is strongly connected to others.  As such, the Command model really doesn’t represent the reality of ICS, even though it’s what we always depict.

The second model, labeled Command of Teams shows collaboration within each team. In consideration of ICS functionality, when I have managed a Planning Section, I expect my team to work together. Yes, they each have different roles and responsibilities, but they all contribute to the primary purpose of the Planning Section. As just a small example, the Demob Unit absolutely must work with the Resources Unit to have knowledge of what resources are on the incident and various data sets about each. They must also collaborate with the Situation Unit Leader who can provide not only information on the current state of things, but hopefully projections of the situation, helping the Demob Unit Leader to develop more accurate timelines for demobilization. This is all well and good, but this model still maintains separation of the major components of the organization (stove-piping).

Next, consider the Team of Teams model, the third in this graphic. At first glance, it looks messy and chaotic, but consider that the principles it tells us are what we should be doing. Again, as a Planning Section Chief, I expect my team members to not just work together, but to coordinate across the entire organization as needed to get their jobs done. Using the Demob Unit as a continued example, their job requires information from and coordination with Logistics, certainly Operations, and even Finance/Admin, and Safety. Their ability to coordinate with others has nothing at all to do with chain of command, and I know my team is more effective when they are interfacing across the organization. My team quickly learns that they don’t need my permission to coordinate with others.

There are several points emphasized in the Team of Teams book that support the Team of Teams model, particularly through the lens of incident management, including:

  1. Efficiency vs Adaptability. Certainly, in incident management we want both, but particularly in the earlier stages of response, adaptability is more important than efficiency. We need to be able to respond to a dynamic, changing environment in the best ways possible. The Team of Teams model maximizes our adaptability.
  2. Procedure vs Purpose. The structure of checklists and other depictions of rigid procedures, which largely serve to strengthen efficiency, can only get us so far in a complex environment. Leaning back into the efficiency vs adaptability argument, rigidity doesn’t serve us well in incident management. When we focus on purpose, we are more adaptable and resilient. When people are focusing exclusively on their own narrow set of tasks, they often lose the big picture that is the overall purpose. In the complexity of incident management, we need to see the forest, not just the trees, in order to understand needs, implications, priorities, dependencies, and options.
  3. Mutually Exclusive and Collectively Exhaustive (MECE) (pronounced mee-see). MECE is used extensively in the business consulting world to depict clear delineation of tasks within one large activity. ICS likes to force us into a MECE environment, which is certainly great for efficiency and eliminating duplication of efforts. While those things are important, the MECE principal eliminates overlap and coordination. The book uses a great example of a sports team to drive this home. Using a sports analogy of my own, consider that in hockey each team has the broad player categories (positions) of forwards, defensemen, and goaltenders. While they each have very distinct purposes and playing strategies, they need to have some overlap to support teamwork, effectiveness, and contingencies. They can’t simply function in a bubble and expect success. ICS loves the rigidity of separating tasks to specific positions, but to be successful there needs to be coordination.
  4. Common Operating Picture. The book uses the term ‘collective intelligence’, but the principal is the same, being that members of the team at large are at least familiar with what is going on, can access more detailed information as needed, and have the information they need to best perform their jobs. The Team of Teams concept promotes this exchange of information and expanded situational awareness.
  5. Leadership at all Levels. While Team of Teams doesn’t explicitly say this, there are several references related to it. We know in any effective organization, especially incident management, the Incident Commander or EOC manager shouldn’t be the only leader. We need leadership practiced at all levels of the organization. We expect Section Chiefs to be leaders; Unit Leaders, Branch Directors, Group Supervisors, etc. Even individual resources can exhibit and practice leadership. This contributes to our adaptability.

After examining these models, I think most will agree that in incident management we really do use the Team of Teams model, but not to the fullest extent. Why is that? I think it’s primarily because we graphically depict our organizations using the Command model and so much of our mindset is fixated on that structure and a perceived rigidity of the positions and flow within that structure. Sure, the Command model is cleaner and less intimidating, but it psychologically predisposes us to silos. In ICS, for example, we do have people coordinating across sections, but aside from the ‘scripted’ activities (i.e. those within the Planning Process), it seems to not come easily.  

We have a lot of room for improvement, and I think we can do so without violating any of the tenets of ICS. We can open ourselves to a more dynamic environment while still maintaining chain of command, unity of command, and span of control. Safety is still emphasized. ICS espouses the free flow of information, but flow of information is different from collaboration – a term rarely found in ICS materials.  In many plans and training that I develop, when I’m referencing certain positions, I often identify the key interactions that position has both within and external to the organization. Interactions are a key to success and need to not just be acknowledged, but emphasized. There is an almost social aspect to the Team of Teams model, but not in the butterfly kind of way. It’s simply a socialization of the system. More people being familiar with what’s going on and what the priorities of others are. This type of environment encourages better communication, more ideas, and an ability to make course corrections on the fly. I think some will push back saying that they want people to ‘stay in their lanes’, but professionals who are well trained should still maintain a primary focus on their job.

Gen. McChrystal emphasizes that a big key to really implementing the Team of Teams model is the mindset of the ranking officer – the Incident Commander or EOC Manager in our case. They need to be willing to let go of what they might have traditionally controlled. They are still absolutely in command, but we need to consider what they should be directly in command of. What decisions REALLY need to be made by the IC or EOC Manager? I’ve seen too many people at that level want to be involved in every decision. I’ve heard all the excuses. Yes, they are the ones ultimately responsible. Yes, they need to justify actions to their boss. But that doesn’t mean they need to have their hands in everything. That’s often less than effective. (Funny enough, I’ve also experienced those who espoused these reasons for micromanaging, yet they were never available to the team to actually make decisions. That puts the team in a difficult position.)

If the ICs or EOC Managers are the ones who set objectives, we could go the extent of saying that any changes of activity within the scope of those objectives should be allowable without needing their approval. That might be a bit extreme for some (yes, I know that they are approving the incident action plan, which identifies things to the tactical level), but if we trust the people who are put in key positions throughout the organization – not only are they all leaders, but armed with a common operating picture and knowing what is called ‘the Commander’s intent’ in military lingo – we should trust that when urgency dictates, they are empowered to make decisions. Pushing decision-making to the lowest practical level can make us more responsive, perhaps saving lives or at least ‘stopping the bleeding’ until a definitive strategy can be developed.

Show the Team of Teams model around a bit. Talk about it. Sure, when people look at that org chart for the first time, I expect there will be some exasperated reactions. But when they read up on it and think it through, they will realize that we already practice it in part. What’s stopping us from full implementation? Two things… a little cultural shift and a varying degree of ego. Silly excuses for not doing things better. We are professionals, after all – right?

There is so much more gold to mine in the Team of Teams book. As mentioned before, I highly recommend this for those interested in organizational development, organizational psychology, incident management, and other related areas. It’s filled full of great examples and will likely prompt a lot of thought as it did for me.  

As always, I’m interested in your thoughts and feedback on this.

© 2021 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

Contingency Planning

I’m going to wrap up 2020 by discussing contingency planning, which is a practice not seen often enough. Before I get started, I should contextualize my use of the term ‘contingency plan’. My general use of the term, at least in emergency management applications, is intended to refer to a plan which may be needed to address the disruption of current event management, incident response, or recovery operations. Essentially, it’s the emergency plan to use while dealing with an emergency, in the event that something bad occurs.

When might you need a contingency plan? Contingency plans should be developed for the kind of situations that have you looking over your shoulder or asking ‘what if…’. Weather events are often good examples, such as a response taking place during some very active tornado weather. You might be responding to the impacts of an earlier tornado, or something completely unrelated, but a tornado warning is in effect, meaning that one could materialize at any time. This could also be a response taking place in a low-lying area during a flash flood warning. We sometimes build contingency plans into our standard operating guidelines or procedures (SOPs/SOGs) by having back-up teams, such as rapid intervention teams (RITs) in the fire service, which are standing by to rescue firefighters in trouble during an interior firefighting operation. Assessing risks on an ongoing basis and developing contingency plans should be part of your incident management battle rhythm.

Where to start with contingency planning? Let’s fall back to the CPG 101 planning process. Yep, that works here, too. The first step is to build your planning team. Contingency planning is a responsibility of the Planning Section, but others need to be involved. Working from a traditional ICS structure, I’d certainly suggest involving Safety and Operations, at a minimum, but depending on circumstances, you may wish to expand this, such as considerations for failures in the supply chain (thus Logistics and Finance/Admin), which may be less of a life safety matter, but can heavily impact operational continuity.

With consideration to the Safety Officer, I’d argue that tactical safety is the primary focus of the Safety Officer; while things that can have much broader impact to the incident, while still a concern of the Safety Officer, may require more in-depth and coordinated planning, thus why I tag the Planning Section to lead contingency planning efforts. My experience has always had the Planning Section taking the lead in this. That said, your incident management organization may decide to assign this to the Safety Officer or an assistant Safety Officer. That’s totally fine in my book, so long as it’s being addressed.

Step two of the planning process is to understand the situation. Some of your risks might be really apparent, such as the tornado warning, but others may require a bit more assessment and discussion. If you need to dig deeper, or are looking at a potential need for a variety of contingency plans, I’d recommend using a risk assessment matrix to help assess the likelihood and impacts of the risks you are examining. Here’s an example of a risk assessment matrix from the United States Marine Corps. Sadly, the risk assessment matrix is not yet a common tool in our incident management doctrine and practices in the US, though I do see it referenced elsewhere. In looking at the tool, obviously those with higher probabilities and severity of impact are the priorities on which to focus. Be sure to consider cascading impacts! Keep in mind that this risk assessment, depending on the duration and kinetics of your response and the dynamics of the environment, may need to be performed more than once throughout your operations. It should at least be considered every operational period.

Step three is to identify goals and objectives. Of course, in the broadest sense, our operational priority is always life safety, but we need to refine this a bit based on the specific hazard we are planning for. Second to life safety, we should also be considering operational continuity, ensuring that we can return to current operations with the least disruption possible OR be able to immediately respond to emergent needs created by the hazard in the event of the hazard creating a more kinetic environment. Your plan may also need to address impacts to the public at large (essentially anyone not part of your incident management organization). Depending on your operational scope and the area of responsibility, this may actually exceed the capacity and mandate of your incident management organization. You will need to determine how to ‘right size’ the scope of your planning efforts. This is perhaps a good opportunity to consult the local emergency manager. Don’t lose focus, though. The contingency plan is not intended to save the world. Remember, responder safety is our number one priority.

Step four is developing the plan. This is largely an outline of the essential elements. There are a number of components to consider for your plan. First, with consideration of cascading impacts, we should identify what aspects of the hazard we can mitigate and how. If there are hasty mitigation steps we can take, those may help limit the risk to life, resources, and operations. Next, consider your concept of operations for the life safety aspect of this plan. As with any other emergency operations type of plan, we need to maintain situational awareness and have protocols for notification and warning. Using the tornado warning (during an active response) as an example, who is responsible for maintaining a watchful eye on the skies and keeping tabs on dynamic weather products? If they see something of concern, who do they notify and how? Is there an emergency radio frequency that everyone’s radio will automatically go to if used? Perhaps three blasts of an air horn? Identify what will work for your operating environment. Keep in mind that if the matter is of urgent life safety, you want to minimize the number of steps and the amount of time taken between awareness and notification to responders. Next, upon notification, what is the emergency action plan – i.e., what needs to take place? Evacuation? Shelter in place? Some other action? A great reference for this from the wildfire incident management community is Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones (LCES), which is part of their incident safety analysis.

What happens after those protective actions? Ideally some kind of status check-in of the impacted personnel for accountability and continued situational awareness. Who is responsible for communicating that and to whom is it communicated? Is it wise to have some sort of rescue team standing by incase anyone is in trouble? If so, what resources need to be tasked to it, what is its organization, and what are their operating protocols? Can you reasonably keep the rescue team out of harm’s way to help ensure continuity of their capability?

You may also have a continuity of operations (COOP) aspect to this plan, to address how the incident management organization will minimize down time, restore prior operations, and possibly even identify alternate methods of operations. Depending on the hazard, a reassessment of the operation may need to take place to see if objectives will change to address a new situation created by impacts from this secondary incident.

Consider the current operational environment that every jurisdiction is facing at this moment. Jurisdictions, EOCs, and others should certainly have a contingency plan in place right now that addresses things like potential Coronavirus exposures, symptomatic personnel, and personnel that test positive. Many have been dealing with it, but do they have their protocols in writing? Most do not. In New York State, all public employers are now required to develop a plan to address these and other factors for public health emergencies.

Step 5 is plan preparation, review, and approval. This is the actual writing of the plan. Of course, you are in the middle of an incident, and it’s likely that the contingency(ies) you are planning for is breathing down your neck. Depending on how much haste is needed, your plan might be a few bullet points, or it could be a few pages long with more detail. Obviously do whatever is appropriate. Have the planning team members review the plan to ensure that it addresses all critical points and accurately reflects the necessary steps. Have you identified what will trigger the plan? Who is responsible for monitoring the situation? Who is responsible or activating the plan? How will they activate it and notify others? What are the responsibilities of others once they are notified?  Once you and the planning team are satisfied that you’ve addressed all the important points, the plan should be forwarded to the appropriate authority for approval, such as the incident commander, EOC manager, agency administrator, etc.

I’ll also note here that if you have multiple threats and/or hazards for which you are developing contingency plans, try to keep your contingency operations as similar as possible. The more complexity you have, especially to deal with different hazards, the more problems can occur during implementation. For example, your means and methods for notifying personnel of a tornado and a flash flood can likely be the same if their protective actions are also the same.

Lastly, step 6 is implementation of the plan. This is where someone should be working on any mitigation actions that you identified and personnel should be briefed on the plan, so they know what they are responsible for and what they need to do, when, and how.

It seems like a long process, but it can be done in a few minutes for urgent hazards. Some contingency plans may certainly be longer and more complex, especially if you are preparing for something that has a lower risk factor or something that isn’t yet a hazard, like a distant weather front. Several years back, I was part of the overhead team for a state-wide months-long debris removal initiative in the aftermath of a late season hurricane. As operations went on, we eventually entered the next hurricane season, and with that we identified the threat of future tropical storms to our area of operations (an entire state) and the operations we were responsible for. We needed to identify who and how systems would be monitored, trigger points for activation of the plan, and how to communicate emergency actions to several debris removal and debris monitoring contractors. We had time leading into hurricane season and were able to develop a well-crafted plan to meet this need. Fortunately, we didn’t have to use it.

Have you written contingency plans for incidents and events? What lessons have you learned from contingency planning?

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As a final bit on 2020, we are all certainly happy to see it pass. Keep in mind that while the new year offers a mental benchmark, we still have months ahead of us continuing to manage the consequences of the pandemic and our response to it. We have learned a lot of lessons from this response, which every organization should be capturing, if you haven’t already. As we go into the new year, resolve to do something meaningful with those lessons learned. Don’t just let them languish in yet another after-action report. Implement those corrective actions!

Stay safe.

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC

FEMA’s 2020 National Preparedness Report – A Review

It seems an annual tradition for me to be reviewing the National Preparedness Report. I’ve endeavored to provide constructive criticism of these documents, which are compilations of data from state and federal agencies, national-level responses, and other sources.

This year’s National Preparedness Report emphasizes that it is based on data from the 2019 calendar year. In looking back on past reports (note: they are no longer on the FEMA site – I was able to find them in the Homeland Security Digital Library) this has been the past practice. Perhaps I never realized it before, but a report talking about data from practically a full year ago seems to hold even less relevance. That means that enacting changes on a national level based on this data may not even begin to occur until two years have passed. Even taking into consideration that states and UASIs are compiling their reports early in a year for the previous year, it still seems a long time to wait for the national level report. This extent of lag is further emphasized by the document’s foreword, written by the FEMA Administrator, which makes many references to COVID-19 and how much different next year’s report will be, while not really speaking at all about the current report. This speaks a lot to how much we, as a practice, are attracted by the shiny objects dangled in front of us, seemingly ignoring all else.

My first pass of the 2020 report brought two primary impressions: 1) The instructive content of the document is some of the best I’ve seen out of FEMA, and 2) There is a considerable lack of data, with a low value for much of what they have included.

In regard to my first impression, the discussion of concepts such as risk (including emerging risk and systemic risk), capabilities, cascading impacts, community lifelines, public-private partnerships, and vulnerable populations has the perfect level of depth and detail. Not only do they discuss each of these concepts, but they also identify how they each connect to each other. This is EXACTLY the kind of consolidation of information we have needed for a long time. This lends itself to truly integrated preparedness and the kinds of information I’ve mentioned many times as being needed, including in the next version of CPG-101. I’m truly impressed with this content, the examples they provide, and how they demonstrate the interconnectedness of it all. I’ll certainly be using this document as a great source of this consolidated information. Now that I’ve extolled my love and adoration for that content, I’m left wondering why it’s in the National Preparedness Report. It’s great content for instructional material and doctrinal material on integrated preparedness, but it really has no place, at least to this extent of detail in the National Preparedness Report. Aside from the few examples they use, there isn’t much value in this format as a report.

This brings me to my next early observation: that of very little actual data contained in the report. Given the extent to which states, territories, UASIs, and other stakeholders provide data to FEMA each year by way of their Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs) and Stakeholder Preparedness Reviews (SPRs), along with various other sources of data, this document doesn’t contain a fraction of what is being reported. There are two map products contained in the entire report, one showing the number of federal disaster declarations for the year, the other showing low-income housing availability across the nation. Given the wide array of information provided by state and UASI, and compiled by FEMA region, surely there must be some really insightful trends and other analysis to provide. There are a few other data sets included in the report showing either raw numbers or percentages – nothing I would really consider analytics. Much of the data is also presented as a snapshot in time, without any comparison to previous years.

Any attempt to view this document as a timely, meaningful, and relevant report on the current state of preparedness in the nation, much less an examination of preparedness over time, is simply an exercise in frustration. The previous year’s report at least had a section titled ‘findings’, even though any real analysis of data there was largely non-existent. This year’s report doesn’t even feign providing a section on findings. To draw on one consistently frustrating example, I’ll use the Core Capability of housing. While this report dances around doctrine and concepts, and even has a section on housing, it’s not addressing why so little preparedness funding or even moderate effort is directed toward addressing the issue of emergency housing, which has arguably been the biggest preparedness gap for time eternal in every state of the nation. Looking broadly at all Core Capabilities, this year’s report provides a chart similar to what we’ve seen in previous years’ reports, identifying how much preparedness funding has gone toward each Core Capability. In relative numbers, very little has changed; even though we know that issues like housing, long-term vulnerability reduction, infrastructure systems, and supply chains have huge gaps. All these reports are telling me is that we’re doing the same things over and over again with little meaningful change.

So there it is… while I really am thoroughly impressed with some of the content of the report, much of that content really doesn’t have a place in this report (at least to such an extent), and for what little data is provided in the report, most of it has very little value. The introduction to the document states that “this year’s report is the product of rigorous research, analysis, and input from stakeholders”. To be blunt, I call bullshit on this statement. I expect a report to have data and various analysis of that data, not only telling us what is, but examining why it is. We aren’t getting that. The National Preparedness Report is an annual requirement per the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. I challenge that FEMA is not meeting the intent of that law with the reports they have been providing. How can we be expected, as a nation, to improve our state of readiness when we aren’t provided with the data needed to support and justify those improvements?

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

EOC Toolkit: National Comment Period

Yesterday FEMA’s National Integration Center distributed notice of a national engagement period on two new Emergency Operations Center (EOC) related documents: EOC References and Resources Tool and the EOC How-To Quick Reference Guide. This seems to be the initiation of an EOC Toolkit, which I conceptually think is a great idea. My first impression of these documents is that they both have good information and are logically organized. The documents are good, but I’m also not particularly impressed by them.

First up is the EOC References and Resources Tool. The document indicates that the audience is ‘EOC leaders and staff’, and the intent is to provide them with ‘a set of best practices, checklists, references, links, and essential guidance related to EOC operations and administration’. This is a two-page document, seemingly formatted for printing (It’s a PDF), but mostly useless in print form as it has an abundance of internet links to sites and documents which provide much more information. The document itself isn’t really a ‘tool’, per se. It doesn’t have, on its own, any intrinsic utility other than referring you to other sources of information. While the description indicates that this document has checklists, it does not, though several of the documents linked from this document do have checklists. The center of the first page provides a link to the EOC Toolkit website, but it’s not particularly highlighted. To be honest, I think this document should, in essence, be the format and content of the EOC Toolkit site.

The second document is the EOC How-To Quick Reference Guide. This is an 80 page document. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen anything labeled a ‘quick reference guide’ be that long. If anything, the EOC References and Resources Tool document (discussed previous) is really the ‘quick reference guide’, while this document is more of a ‘tool’. There is solid information in this document, nothing that from a quick review I have any quarrel with. The content areas are fairly comprehensive, giving information on hazard, vulnerability, and capability assessment; EOC site selection; EOC capabilities and physical design; information management; and preparedness. That said, it doesn’t give you much content within any of the topic areas. It almost feels like a literature review.

As with the other document, this document is formatted for printing, but is full of hyperlinks to sites that expand greatly on the information provided. So it’s not really anything I would recommend printing and putting in a binder. Electronically, it does make it a good compendium of resources, but with how rapidly things change and the frequency of new sources of good information becoming available, I think this document is also best organized as a website that can be updated in real time as new information comes available. As soon as one link changes, the document becomes obsolete. That said, the resources they link to are all good and worthwhile. An attachment to this document provides a fairly comprehensive EOC self-assessment tool; though the tool doesn’t really address partially or fully virtual EOC operations and remote access; and while it goes to an extent of detail asking about certain things (such as a helicopter landing pad), it completely misses some functional things (such as dry erase boards) and is far from comprehensive in the realm of security.

As with most national comment periods, the NIC has provided the documents (though without numbered lines) and a comment form. These, along with information on webinars they are conducting, are posted here: https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/emergency-operations-center-eoc-toolkit-how-quick-reference-references-and-tools.

All in all, I feel like these documents hit the outer ring of a dart board. They are fine, but not really close to the bullseye. It seems these were assembled by a NIC employee or consultant who has spent little to no time in an EOC, much less having any role in the design or preparedness activities for an EOC. As I mentioned earlier, they feel a lot like a literature review – providing a summary of sources but themselves providing very little information. Not that that’s a bad thing – but I’d rather see this in a website format.

What are your thoughts on the documents? 

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

Integrating Emergency Management in Local Government

I think we’re all pretty familiar with and confident in the ability of typical emergency services organizations to properly and appropriately address ‘routine’ responses – that is, those that last a few minutes to a few hours. It’s the extended operations, those that last many hours, or even into days, weeks, and months that traditional response organizations have difficulty with.

The incidents – generally categorized as Type 3 or higher – have very different dynamics. The requirements of these incidents are different. We can’t just roll our usual response, or even throw everything we have at it at one time. We need to rotate resources. We often need resources which are not used to using. We need to provide close support to our resources. Typical emergency services are practically all Command and Operations. Planning and Logistics, much less Finance, are virtually non-existent in the first responder world. Of course, this applies to not just response, but emergency management activities comprehensively.

A true integration of emergency management is absolutely necessary at the local level. Every jurisdiction should identify, and with the approval of the chief executive, how this will happen. What will the triggers be for this? There should be a recognition that this isn’t about taking anything away from the fire chief or police chief – in fact this is about giving them access to greater resources. These chief officers and the leaders beneath them are expected to be experts at the things they deal with 97% of the time. It needs to be accepted that someone else can help guide them through the other three percent.

Again, this is just within the realm of response. Most agencies have little to no active role in mitigation, recovery, or other emergency management tasks – much less the knowledge to take them on. Granted, some don’t explicitly have those activities as part of their agency’s charter, but all do go beyond response to some extent. Emergency management needs to permeate the activities of every agency. Someone should be thinking about it, coordinating with the jurisdiction’s emergency manager, and advising their own agency’s leadership. Of course, this transcends response; it applies to all phases and mission areas of emergency management, with focal points appropriate to the mission of each respective agency.

Planning

This is one of our biggest gaps in preparedness at the local government level. Sure, some first responder organizations have plans for extended and complex incidents – but how well are the plans written? Are they up to date with contemporary practices? Are leaders at every level familiar with them and ready to implement them? Are these activities exercised? The answers to these questions tend to lean toward the negative.

Organizing

<This point is really the crux of my thoughts on this topic. Properly staffing emergency management functions is a considerable path to success.>

Deliberate planning efforts need to include emergency managers, who must be given proper authority by the chief executive to take action and access needed resources. This also means that to be most effective, an emergency manager should absolutely not be placed within another organization. Absent good and confident leadership from that organization, their actions will almost always result in bias filtered through the leadership of the home organization. The emergency manager, during an extended response, becomes a considerable asset to Command and to the jurisdiction as a whole. While they are not there to assume Command, they are there to coordinate internal and external resources to support Command, as well as being familiar with the plans to an extent Command may not be and to support thinking beyond the initial response.

As mentioned earlier, I also believe that most government agencies should have someone responsible for emergency management in their own agency. For smaller jurisdictions this is likely not going to be a full time job, but with an individual tasked and responsible for emergency management at the agency or department level, that helps ensure proper attention to the matter – across all phases and mission areas. Certainly, mid-sized towns and larger should have less difficulty with this, beyond establishing protocol and incentivizing. We already have common practice in various agencies for personnel that hold certain qualifications, such as fire department personnel becoming paramedics. This is often incentivized with a stipend or an altogether higher rate of pay, along with time being given for maintaining the certification and other related professional development. Think about how effective agencies would be if each had someone responsible for emergency management. As well as benefits to the jurisdiction. And yes, even volunteer EMS and fire departments can do this (I served as the designated ‘crisis and emergency manager’ for a volunteer EMS organization for a period of time).

Training

This needs to cover a broad span of things we might consider training. The softest is more at an awareness level – socializing the plan. Making sure that people are familiar with it to the extent necessary. This isn’t just chief officers and department heads, either. Often, they aren’t the ones who need to have early recognition of a situation’s applicability to plan. This socialization needs to take place all levels of leadership.

Being familiar with a plan isn’t enough, though. Being able to implement the plan is largely contingent on targeted, effective, and persistent training – and certainly beyond the awareness level. What training is needed to implement the plan? Who needs to be trained? To what extent of proficiency?

Exercises

If you follow my blog, you know I’ve written on the benefits, ways, and means of exercising to a considerable extent. ‘nuff said. If not: lots of information here.

Let’s be honest, nothing here is a novel approach. A good number of local jurisdictions (I’ll also include counties and parishes in this definition) already implement some version of this. It certainly is a best practice that a lot of jurisdictions are missing out on. Sure, it takes some work, and proper authority, and meetings, and buy in, and training, and more meetings… but what in our world doesn’t require these things?  I think one disaster should clearly show the benefits of this to any jurisdiction.  It’s interesting though, that despite being aware of other practices, so many jurisdictions are stuck doing the same thing they’ve always done. In many ways we are hurt by tradition, apathy, and indifference as much as any disaster. If jurisdictions aren’t prepared to effectively deal with disasters, how well do you think they will do? This doesn’t even require that much structure change or direct cost – just deliberate action.

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®