Keeping the C in CERT

I’m a big fan of Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT). For several years I was, in addition to other duties, New York State’s CERT program coordinator. I had interactions with most CERT programs in the state, conducted many CERT train-the-trainer courses, and managed federal CERT and Citizen Corps grant programs. CERT programs, when properly organized, managed, and maintained hold incredible value to their communities.

For those not fully aware of what CERT is, it is a construct that arose from high earthquake hazard communities in California a few decades ago. It is founded on the recognition that the true first responders to a disaster are in fact community members who will tend to themselves, their families, and their neighbors. The core CERT training provides information and skills practice on team organization, first aid, light search and rescue, hazard recognition, and more. Fundamentally, CERT organizations will self-activate in the event of a sudden disaster to care for those immediately around them. CERT programs have evolved in a positive fashion through the years, spreading around the nation and the world. Ideally, they should be formed with a linkage to local emergency responders, and can be leveraged to support community preparedness and mitigation efforts as well. CERT programs are organized around the needs of their communities, with their operational protocols and training rooted in that local need. The C in CERT is for COMMUNITY.

For many years, FEMA has been developing the National Qualification System (NQS), which supports resource typing as a key component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The primary purpose of the NQS is to establish standards for positions and functions utilized in emergency management, with the greatest benefit being the requesting, processing, deployment, and utilization of resources to disaster areas. These efforts strongly support effective resource management by providing consistent definitions of capability for various kinds and types of resources, backed up by a means for resources to track and even certify progress toward meeting those qualifications.

Yesterday, FEMA released a NIMS Alert for NQS information for several CERT positions. To be honest, this frustrates the hell out of me. CERT is a community-level resource. Not one that is intended to be deployed. Yes, FEMA has called for and deployed CERT personnel in the past, but this is not a consistent practice, has not happened often, and as far as I know was deemed a less than effective utilization. The draft position task books provided by the NQS for comment for CERT indicate roles in support of the CERTs in the jurisdictions in which they are being deployed. While some jurisdictions have prepared CERT members for roles beyond the core tasks associated with CERT, such as EOC support or field data collection, CERT is not fundamentally expected to be a long-term function in the aftermath of a disaster, so to be deploying personnel to support sustained ‘normal’ CERT operations is largely a misutilization and clearly a misunderstanding of what CERT is fundamentally about, especially when most external resources requests occur days or even weeks after a disaster.

CERT members and CERT programs are and should be focused on their own neighborhoods and communities. As individuals and as organizations they are generally not trained, equipped, or otherwise prepared to be deployable resources. They are also not being deployed to a disaster in a professional capacity, many of which have their own NQS documents. While it may sound like a great opportunity for people who want to make a difference, there are a lot of pitfalls – many of which I saw when FEMA requested CERT volunteers from around the nation to deploy for Gulf coast hurricanes about 15 years ago.

The NQS documents identify several trainings in addition to the Basic CERT course, most of which are FEMA Independent Study courses which only provide a general baseline of knowledge; and none of which specifically address issues associated with actually deploying to a disaster area. If CERT personnel wish to be deployable resources, they should do so through organizations such as the Red Cross, Team Rubicon, World Central Kitchen, or the myriad faith-based groups who are established and reputed providers of various disaster-essential services. These are entities that are also organizationally capable of managing personnel and the logistical and procedural requirements of a deployment, of which there are many. These organizations train and prepare personnel for deployments, have experienced personnel that manage and coordinate deployments, they ensure they are managed and cared for on site, they support supply chains, and are experienced in addressing liability matters.

The bottom line here is that we are expecting too much from people signed up to support a disaster response in or even near their own communities, but not to be deployed around the country. I’m sure I’ll get some responses from people espousing some specific successes in deploying CERT personnel outside their jurisdiction, of which I’m sure there are; however that is the exception and not the rule. It’s not what CERT is or ever was intended to be. I’m a big fan and supporter of CERT, and believe in the extraordinary abilities of trained, organized volunteers, but I strongly feel that CERT is not a deployable asset. Personnel who are interested in such endeavors should be steered towards organizations that have the expertise in doing so.

Your thoughts, of course, are welcome.

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

A National Disaster Safety Board

You’ve heard of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), right? If not, the nitty gritty of it is that they are an independent federal accident investigation agency. They determine probable cause of the full range of major transportation incidents, typically putting forward safety recommendations. They are granted some specific authorities related to these investigations, such as being the lead federal agency to investigate them (absent criminal aspects) and they maintain a schedule of deployment-ready teams for this purpose.  They can conduct investigative hearings (ever see the film Sully?) and publish public reports on these matters. Overall, I’ve had positive interactions with NTSB representatives and have found their work to be highly effective.

While certainly related to emergency management, the main purpose for my quick review of the NTSB in this post is to provide a starting point of understanding for Congressional legislation urging the formation of a National Disaster Safety Board (NDSB). The draft bill for discussion can be found here. This bill has been put forth with bi-partisan sponsors in both the US Senate and the House of Representatives.

The purpose of the NDSB, per this bill, is:

  1. To reduce future losses by learning from incidents, including underlying factors.
  2. Provide lessons learned on a national scale.
  3. Review, analyze, and recommend without placing blame.
  4. Identify and make recommendations to address systemic causes of incidents and loss from incidents.
  5. Prioritize efforts that focus on life safety and injury prevention, especially in regard to disproportionately impacted communities.

To execute this mission, the bill provides that the NDSB will have the authority to review incidents with 10 or more fatalities; may self-determine the need for board review of an incident; and shall have the full ability to investigate, review, and report on incidents.

The bill directs the NDSB to coordinate with all levels of government to identify and adopt standard methods of measuring impacts of disasters to provide for consistent trend analysis and comparisons, and to ensure that these standards are uniformly applied. The bill requires the NDSB to coordinate with all levels of government in their investigations during incident responses, and to participate in the incident command system for coordination of efforts as well as investigative purposes. Affected authorities shall have an opportunity to review the NDSB report 30 days prior to publication.

The NDSB will be comprised of seven board members, selected by the President from a slate of candidates provided by both houses of Congress, with no more than four board members having affiliation with the same political party, and with all members having technical and/or professional qualifications in emergency management, fire management, EMS, public health, engineering, or social and behavioral sciences.

There is a lot of other legalese and detail in the bill, but I’m happy to find that the language supports coordination among and with federal agencies, including FEMA, NIST, NTSB, and others; and also has an emphasis on investigating impacts to disproportionately impacted communities. The bill also charges the NDSB with conducting special studies as they see fit and providing technical support for the implementation of recommendations.

I’m thrilled with this effort and I’m hopeful the bill progresses to law. We have had a history of outstanding research from academic institutions and after action reports from government entities, which should all still continue, but it’s incredibly substantial that the NDSB will establish standards and consistency in how we examine disasters over time. We’ve seen how impactful the NTSB has been since its inception in 1967, and I feel the NDSB could have an even greater impact examining a broader spectrum of disasters. This is an effort which has been long encouraged by various emergency management related groups. The NDSB, I suspect, will also support a stronger and more defined FEMA, as well as strengthening all aspects of emergency management at all levels.

What thoughts do you have on the NDSB? What do you hope will come of it?

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC

COVID-19 Vaccine Administration Preparedness

On September 16, the CDC released the COVID-19 Vaccination Program Interim Playbook for Jurisdiction Operations. This document lays out some fairly realistic expectations of jurisdictions (mostly states) in their distribution, administration, and tracking of COVID-19 vaccinations. That said, even though there continue to be many unknowns about the vaccines to be utilized, dosages, timetable of availability, and how and where vaccines will be delivered to states, there are reasonable assumptions that could be made and high probability strategies identified, which the CDC failed to do. Instead, as is a hallmark of many poor managers, they provided a punch list of considerably detailed demands but not the very essential information and parameters needed to support good planning. Information is everything.

Garbage in/garbage out is a pretty simple concept of utilizing poor or lacking information to inform a process, which will result in similar outputs. After reviewing New York State’s COVID-19 Vaccination Plan, that concept is fully demonstrated. Most sections of New York State’s plan are vague at best, saying what they will do but not how they will do it. They do identify some roles and responsibilities, but without delineating the boundaries between functionaries. For example: they will utilize pharmacies, local health departments, and state-run facilities, among others, to accomplish public vaccination. This is a solid and expected strategy, but the responsibilities for each are poorly defined for their own operations, much less how they will or won’t work together. Many concepts in the plan are vague at best, and even lacking more defined federal guidance, should have better detail. A big component of vaccination will be community delivery through local health departments, yet this is barely acknowledged. I would have expected this plan to provide guidance and outline preparedness requirements for local health departments, even if they were communicated separately. I acknowledge this is intended to be a strategic level plan, but it doesn’t seem to even consistently provide that measure of detail. I’m left with a lot of questions. And while it may be petty, the document itself is poorly written and published – I expect better from state government.

I’ve not looked at the plans of other states, but if this is indicative of the general state of things, the term ‘shit show’ is the phrase that comes to mind. While we will no doubt improve, there is a long way to go and I think jurisdictions will find themselves in a bind, being poorly prepared when they receive notice of an imminent delivery of vaccines with no detailed plan or assigned resources to get the job done. If anything, we have had plenty of time to prepare for vaccination efforts. There are clearly failures at all levels. While communication between and among federal, state, and local jurisdictions has certainly taken place beyond these documents, the standards and measures need to be more apparent.

We need to do better and be better. Reflecting a bit on the piece I wrote yesterday, we need to be thorough and imaginative in our preparedness efforts without excluding possibilities. Local jurisdictions must be prepared to support vaccinations in their communities. As I’ve written before, most health departments simply don’t have the capacity to do this. Jurisdictions need to engage with their health departments for the best guidance possible and work from that. An 80% solution now is better than a 20% solution later. As with any disaster, local communities are the first stakeholder and the last.

What are you seeing from your states? What do you think is missing in our overall efforts?

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®

Don’t Plan Yourself into a Corner

I’ve long been an advocate for detailed planning. Plans should identify who (by position or title) are decision-makers, who are action agents, and how things are to be done. Without identifying these responsible parties and the processes necessary to execute planned actions, plans will generally lack the ability to be successfully implemented. Context is also important. To address this, plans have a preamble that identifies the scope and objectives of the plan. All of this tells us what circumstances the plan is intended to apply to and what it expects to accomplish. Details matter. That said, making plans too specific can also spell trouble.

(I figured putting up the cover Michael McCaul’s Failures of Imagination was suitable for this post, as it’s all about emergency management suffering from a lack of imagination.)

In terms of context, only some plans need to be very precise about when and how they are used. Give yourself some wiggle room. If you don’t provide a proper and wide enough scope and objectives to the plan, you are already poisoning the well. Case in point – a lot of entities have realized that their pandemic plans have failed them, and as such are re-writing their plans. I’m hearing of many totally scrapping their old pandemic plans and writing the new ones as if all future infectious disease outbreaks will behave exactly as Coronavirus has. The old plans largely failed not necessarily because our assumptions were wrong, but because they were too narrow. Don’t make the same mistake. A proper scope and objectives will help properly define what you want to address. If these are too focused or narrow, you leave out a lot of possibilities.

When it comes to strategies and procedures, plans often fail because they don’t have enough detail. But plans can also fail if they are too restrictive or if the strategies and procedures don’t align with the scope and objectives. Restrictive plans define rigid circumstances under which approaches are taken, and/or those approaches are so rigidly defined that they will only work under certain circumstances or with all the right personnel and resources. You’ve been through disasters, right? You realize that disasters impose extreme circumstances upon us; impacting health, safety, and infrastructure; and we rarely ever have all the resources we would like to have in resolving that disaster. In fact, I’d argue that if disasters only impacted us the way we want them to, it would be more of an inconvenience rather than a disaster.

So unless you expect your title to change to Inconvenience Manager, remember that all preparedness starts with planning. Do your research and know your hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities, but don’t be totally encumbered by them either. Broaden your planning assumptions where you can, which will open your scope. Ensure that your planning objectives truly define what you intend for the plan to accomplish. Plan with greater detail and fewer restrictions. Ensure that succession and chain of command are addressed, so it’s not just a certain title or position that has authority over certain actions. Ensure that people are cross trained and that both people and plans are exercised with a certain extent of random factors in scenarios. Our plans and our resources must be agile to be successful.

Sure, we can improvise and get out of a corner that our plans back us into or don’t address, but we are better prepared if we can acknowledge the possibility of other scenarios. This is why planning teams contribute to successful plans. It’s the different perspectives they bring, with a lot of ‘what ifs’ and different viewpoints. Open your eyes and look around. One of the biggest enemies of emergency management is tradition. Is it any wonder why the same corrective actions keep rising to the surface?  Do better. Be better.

Thoughts?

© 2020 Timothy Riecker, CEDP

Emergency Preparedness Solutions, LLC®